Logic and Epistemology in Safety Cases

John Rushby

Invited paper. Appears in Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security: Proceedings of SafeComp 32, Toulouse, France, September 2013, Springer LNCS 8153, pp. 1-7.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40793-2_1

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A safety case must resolve concerns of two different kinds: how complete and accurate is our knowledge about aspects of the system (e.g., its requirements, environment, implementation, hazards) and how accurate is our reasoning about the design of the system, given our knowledge.

The first of these is a form of epistemology and requires human experience and insight, but the second can, in principle, be reduced to logic and then checked and automated using the technology of formal methods.

We propose that reducing epistemic doubt is the main challenge in safety cases, and discuss ways in which this might be achieved.




BibTeX Entry

	AUTHOR = {John Rushby},
	TITLE = {Logic and Epistemology in Safety Cases},
	BOOKTITLE = {{{\sc SafeComp}} 2013: Proceedings of the 32nd International
		Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security},
	MONTH = sep,
	YEAR = 2013,
	pages = {1--7},
	ADDRESS = {Toulouse, France},
	PUBLISHER = {Springer-Verlag},
	SERIES = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
	NUMBER = 8153

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