Safety Envelope for Security

Ashish Tiwari, Bruno Dutertre, Dejan Jovanovic, Thomas de Candia, Patrick D Lincoln, John Rushby, Dorsa Sadigh, and Sanjit Seshia

Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference On High Confidence Networked Systems, pp. 85-94 (ACM).


We present an approach for detecting sensor spoofing attacks on a cyber-physical system. Our approach consists of two steps. In the first step, we construct a safety envelope of the system. Under nominal conditions (that is, when there are no attacks), the system always stays inside its safety envelope. In the second step, we build an attack detector: a monitor that executes synchronously with the system and raises an alarm whenever the system state falls outside the safety envelope. We synthesize safety envelopes using a modifed machine learning procedure applied on data collected from the system when it is not under attack. We present experi- mental results that show effectiveness of our approach, and also validate the several novel features that we introduced in our learning procedure.

Link to the paper at ACM Digital Library

Citations from Google scholar

BibTeX Entry

	TITLE = {Safety Envelope for Security},
	AUTHOR = {Ashish Tiwari and Bruno Dutertre and Dejan Jovanovi{\'c}
		and Thomas de Candia and Patrick D. Lincoln and John
		Rushby and Dorsa Sadigh and Sanjit Seshia},
	BOOKTITLE = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference
		on High Confidence Networked Systems {(HiCoNS)}},
	PAGES = {85--94},
	MONTH = apr,
	YEAR = 2014,
	ADDRESS = {Berlin, Germany},

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