We also consider the relationship between transitive and intransitive formulations of security. We show that the standard formulations of noninterference and unwinding correspond exactly to our intransitive formulations, specialized to the transitive case. We show that transitive polices are precisely the "multilevel security" (MLS) polices, and that any MLS secure system satisfies the conditions of the unwinding theorem.
In addition, we consider the relationship between noninterference formulations of security and access control formulations, and we identify the "reference monitor assumptions" that play a crucial role in establishing the soundness of access control implementations.
The version that used to be here was incorrectly dated and lacked the
appendices.
longer version with formal appendices
@techreport{Rushby92:intransitive-noninterference,
TITLE = {Noninterference, Transitivity, and Channel-Control Security
Policies},
AUTHOR = {John Rushby},
INSTITUTION = {Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International},
YEAR = 1992,
NUMBER = {SRI-CSL-92-2},
ADDRESS = {Menlo Park, CA},
MONTH = dec
}