Mechanized Formal Analysis for Safety-Critical Systems: The Convergence of Need and Opportunity

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Overview

- The need
- But why mechanized formal analysis?
- The opportunity

The Need

- More and more safety-critical applications
- More complex safety-critical applications
- More challenging regulatory frameworks
- More challenging commercial environment

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More Challenging Regulatory Frameworks

- Integrated modular avionics
 - RTCA SC-200 and Eurocae WG60
- Want modular certification based on separately qualified components
- It's not enough to show the components are "good"
 - $\circ~$ Like the inertial measurement units of Ariane 4 and 5 $\,$
- Need to be able to show the combination of components will be "good"
 - Unlike in Ariane 5
- This is what computer scientists call compositional reasoning
 - Deducing properties of the combination
 - From those of the components
 - Plus some "algebra of combination"

But compositional certification is different from compositional verification









Assurance for Discrete Logic

- That is, requirements, specifications, code having lots of discrete conditions
- Absence of continuity means that extrapolation from incomplete testing is unsound
- Combinations of different behaviors grow so rapidly complete testing is infeasible
- However, symbolic analysis can (in principle) consider all cases
 - \circ E.g., examine the consequences of x < y rather than enumerating

 $(1, 2), (1,3), (1, 4), \dots (2, 3), \dots$

Sound and feasible, though hard

• This is what formal analysis is about

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But Hasn't That Been Tried and Failed?

Yes, it failed for three reasons

- No suitable design descriptions
 - Code is formal, but too big, and too late
 - Requirements and specifications were informal
 - Engineers rejected formal specification languages (e.g., ours)
- Narrow notion of formal verification
 - Didn't contribute to traditional processes (e.g., testing)
 - Didn't reduce costs or time (e.g., by early fault detection)
 - It was "all or nothing"
- Lack of automation
 - Couldn't mechanize the huge search effectively
 - o So needed human guidance—and interactive theorem proving is an arcane skill

But now there's an opportunity to fix all that



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- Here, we're interested in SCADE
- And in the exciting prospects that it's now under the same roof as Esterel

• E.g., Use of SyncCharts to describe complex discrete logic

- And in links to Matlab (Simulink/Stateflow)
- These give access to formal descriptions throughout the lifecycle
- Now, we just need to add analysis









Decision Procedures

- Tell whether a logical formula is inconsistent, satisfiable, or valid
- Or whether one formula is a consequence of others
 - E.g., does $4 \times x = 2$ follow from $x \le y$, $x \le 1 y$, and $2 \times x \ge 1$ when the variables range over the reals?

Can use heuristics for speed, but always terminate and give the correct answer

• Most interesting formulas involve several theories

 \circ E.g., does

 $f(cons(4 \times car(x) - 2 \times f(cdr(x)), y)) = f(cons(6 \times cdr(x), y))$

follow from $2 \times car(x) - 3 \times cdr(x) = f(cdr(x))$?

Requires the theories of uninterpreted functions, linear arithmetic, and lists simultaneously

• We want methods for deciding combinations of theories that are modular (combine individual decision procedures), integrated (share state for efficiency), and sound

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Bounded Model Checking (ctd.)

• Given a system specified by initiality predicate I and transition relation T on states S, there is a counterexample of length k to invariant P if there is a sequence of states s_0, \ldots, s_k such that

 $I(s_0) \wedge T(s_0, s_1) \wedge T(s_1, s_2) \wedge \cdots \wedge T(s_{k-1}, s_k) \wedge \neg P(s_k)$

- Given a Boolean encoding of I and T (i.e., a circuit), this is a propositional satisfiability (SAT) problem
- Needs less tinkering than BDD-based symbolic model checking, and can handle bigger systems and find deeper bugs
- Now widely used in hardware verification

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Infinite BMC

- Suppose T is not a circuit, but software, or a high-level specification
- It'll be defined over reals, integers, arrays, datatypes, with function symbols, constants, equalities, inequalities etc.
- So we need to solve the BMC satisfiability problem

$$I(s_0) \wedge T(s_0, s_1) \wedge T(s_1, s_2) \wedge \cdots \wedge T(s_{k-1}, s_k) \wedge \neg P(s_k)$$

over these theories

- Typical example
 - $\circ~T$ has 1,770 variables, formula is 4,000 lines of text
 - Want to do BMC to depth 40
- Hey! That's exactly what ICS does
- Patent pending

Infinite and Finite BMC

- Later lifecycle products replace infinite integers by fixed width bitvectors, etc.
- Can encode some of these datatypes in pure SAT
 - o E.g., bitvectors as array of booleans, bounded integers as bitvectors
- Then provide SAT-level implementations of operations on them
 - o E.g., hardware-like adders, shifters
- And that will semi-decide some combination of theories
- Exponentially less efficient than ICS decision procedures on many things where it does work (e.g., barrel shifter)
- But exact tradeoffs are fuzzy at lowest levels, and some applications will already split things up (e.g., arrays) before they send them to ICS
- So we're providing a "dial" that determines how much of the analysis for finite types is handled by decision procedures and how much by SAT

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- We should require that s_0, \ldots, s_k are distinct
 - Otherwise there's a shorter counterexample
- And we should not allow any but s_0 to satisfy I
 - Otherwise there's a shorter counterexample
- If there's no path of length k satisfying these two constraints, and no counterexample has been found of length less than k, then we have verified P
 - By finding its finite diameter





- With big problems, may be unable to take k far enough to be interesting
- So, instead, start from states found during random simulation
- Can be seen as a way to amplify the power of simulation
- Or to extend its reach









Calculating an Abstraction

- We need to figure out if we need a transition between any pair of abstract states
- Given abstraction function $\phi : [S \rightarrow \hat{S}]$ we have

 $\hat{T}(\hat{s}_1, \hat{s}_2) \Leftrightarrow \exists s_1, s_2 : \hat{s}_1 = \phi(s_1) \land \hat{s}_2 = \phi(s_2) \land T(s_1, s_2)$

- We use highly automated theorem proving to construct the abstracted system:
 - o If we include transition iff the formula is proved
 - There's a chance we may fail to prove true formulas
 - This will produce unsound abstractions
- So turn the problem around and calculate when we don't need a transition: omit transition iff the formula is proved

 $\neg \hat{T}(\hat{s}_1, \hat{s}_2) \Leftrightarrow \vdash \forall s_1, s_2 : \hat{s}_1 \neq \phi(s_1) \lor \hat{s}_2 \neq \phi(s_2) \lor \neg T(s_1, s_2)$

- Now theorem-proving failure affects accuracy, not soundness
- We call this "failure tolerant theorem proving"

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Looking Forward

- We would like to work with SCADE developers and users
- And with academic researchers
- To explore and prototype embedded formal analyses of the kinds I've described
- Build on existing collaborations and associations with Verimag, Paris VI and VII, Paris-Sud, ENS, Nancy, Paul Sabatier, LAAS, ONERA-CERT

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