Safety Envelope for Security
Ashish Tiwari, Bruno Dutertre, Dejan Jovanovic, Thomas
de Candia, Patrick D Lincoln, John Rushby, Dorsa Sadigh, and Sanjit
Seshia
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference On High Confidence
Networked Systems, pp. 85-94 (ACM).
Abstract
We present an approach for detecting sensor spoofing attacks on a
cyber-physical system. Our approach consists of two steps. In the
first step, we construct a safety envelope of the system. Under
nominal conditions (that is, when there are no attacks), the system
always stays inside its safety envelope. In the second step, we build
an attack detector: a monitor that executes synchronously with the
system and raises an alarm whenever the system state falls outside the
safety envelope. We synthesize safety envelopes using a modifed
machine learning procedure applied on data collected from
the system when it is not under attack. We present experi-
mental results that show effectiveness of our approach, and
also validate the several novel features that we introduced
in our learning procedure.
Link to the paper at
ACM Digital
Library
Citations
from Google scholar
BibTeX Entry
@inproceedings{Tiwari-etal:hicons14,
TITLE = {Safety Envelope for Security},
AUTHOR = {Ashish Tiwari and Bruno Dutertre and Dejan Jovanovi{\'c}
and Thomas de Candia and Patrick D. Lincoln and John
Rushby and Dorsa Sadigh and Sanjit Seshia},
BOOKTITLE = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference
on High Confidence Networked Systems {(HiCoNS)}},
PAGES = {85--94},
MONTH = apr,
YEAR = 2014,
ADDRESS = {Berlin, Germany},
ORGANIZATION = {ACM}
}
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