



CS3202: Logic, Specification and Verification

CS3202-LSV 2006–07

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Lecture 4 (20/02/2007):

Intuitionistic vs. classical logic

Decorating proof-trees with variables and terms

A typo in the tutorial sheet

- Prove? $\vdash ((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A$
- Check whether it is a tautology. Conclusion?

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Truthtable

•

A	B	$A \Rightarrow B$	$(A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A$	$((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow A$
T	T	T	T	T
T	F	F	T	T
F	T	T	F	T
F	F	T	F	T

Reasoning by contradiction

•

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{[A] \quad [\neg A]}{\perp} \\
 \frac{\perp}{\neg} \\
 B \\
 \frac{[(A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A] \quad A \Rightarrow B}{A} \\
 \frac{A \quad [\neg A]}{\perp} \\
 \frac{\perp}{\neg} \\
 A \\
 \frac{((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow A}{}
 \end{array}$$

Is this correct?

Reasoning by contradiction

- In fact we proved:

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{[A] \quad [\neg A]}{\perp} \\
 \frac{\perp}{B} \\
 \frac{[(A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A] \quad A \Rightarrow B}{A} \quad [\neg A] \\
 \frac{A \quad [\neg A]}{\perp} \\
 \frac{\perp}{\neg \neg A} \\
 \hline
 ((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow \neg \neg A
 \end{array}$$

Natural deduction: soundness & completeness

- Soundness: $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \vdash \phi$ implies $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \models \phi$.

Completeness: $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \models \phi$ implies $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \vdash \phi$?

No.

Classical Logic vs. Intuitionistic Logic

- Last lectures: *Intuitionistic Logic*

Semantically *incomplete* (w.r.t. truth tables)

- *Classical logic* is obtained by adding:

Reasoning by contradiction

$$\begin{array}{c} [\neg A] \\ \vdots \\ \perp \\ \hline A \end{array}$$

Elimination of Double Negation

$$\frac{\neg\neg A}{A}$$

Peirce's Law

$$\frac{(A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A}{A}$$

Semantically *complete* (w.r.t. truth tables)

Proof-terms for proof-trees

Linking open/active leaves and variables

- We use *Variables* to keep track of the set of open/active leaves.
- In Coq: `Variable H:A.`
- Idea: Represent proofs with terms /
Decorate inference rules & steps with terms and variable annotations
- Along proof tree: need to keep track of the link open/active leaves —
variables in an *Environment* (a.k.a. *Context*):
Environment = mapping from variables to wff (e.g. $x : A$ for $x \mapsto A$)
- In decorated trees: Nodes are labelled with *environment+term+wff*

$$\Gamma \vdash M : A$$

Typing, proofs...

- *Noooooo!* same symbol as in $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \vdash \phi$!

But... it will be the case (to be checked in each decorated rule later) that

There exists an M & a (decorated) proof-tree of

$$x_1 : \phi_1, \dots, x_n : \phi_n \vdash M : \phi$$

if & only if

$$\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \vdash \phi$$

- Notion of *Typing*: $\Gamma \vdash M : A$ “ M is of type A in the environment Γ ”
= “ M represents a proof of A under the (decorated) assumptions Γ ”

Natural deduction as a Typing System

- Use of an hypothesis:

$$\frac{}{\Gamma, x : A \vdash x : A}$$

On the l.-h. side, the *wff* A is declared to be available as an open assumption, decorated with x .

The *proof-tree* A (or rather, $\frac{A}{A}$ copy ?), having the wff A as an open assumption, concludes A and is decorated by x in the environment $\Gamma, x : A$.

“copy” = “use” ?

Natural deduction as a Typing System

- $\Rightarrow$ -introduction:

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \vdash M : B}{\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x : A. M) : A \Rightarrow B}$$

NB: In CoQ's concrete syntax

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \vdash M : B}{\Gamma \vdash (\text{fun } x : A => M) : A \rightarrow B}$$

In fact, no need for `imp_i`:

imp_i *A B (fun x:A=>M)* is *fun x:A=>M*

This is **(Creation of) unnamed function** (see next slide)

Natural deduction as a Typing System

- Coq's definitions: `Let myfavoritename := myterm.`
or `Definition myfavoritename := myterm.`
- Hence, think of `Let myfunction := fun x:A => M.` as
`myfunction (x:A){`
 `...`
 `M`
 `...`
 `}`

It is of type $A \rightarrow B$ (if M is of type B)

x is only available in the body M of the function.

A is an assumption temporarily made for the (sub-)proof M of B .

Natural deduction as a Typing System

- $\Rightarrow$ -elimination (a.k.a. *Modus Ponens*):

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M : A \Rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \vdash N : A}{\Gamma \vdash M N : B}$$

Again, no need for `imp_e`: *imp_e A B M N* is *M N*

This is **Function application**

Natural deduction as a Typing System

- $\vee$ -introduction:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M : A}{\Gamma \vdash \text{or_introl } M : A \vee B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash M : B}{\Gamma \vdash \text{or_intror } M : A \vee B}$$

Again, no need for `or_il`: *or_il A B M* is *or_introl M*
and similarly for `or_ir`.

This is a **Cast** in a union type, with a tag to remember which side of the union a term comes from.

Natural deduction as a Typing System

- $\vee$ -elimination:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M : A \vee B \quad \Gamma, x : A \vdash N : C \quad \Gamma, y : B \vdash P : C}{\Gamma \vdash \text{match } M \text{ with } \begin{array}{l} \text{or_introl } x \Rightarrow N \\ \text{|or_intror } y \Rightarrow P \\ \text{end} \end{array} : C}$$

$\Gamma \vdash$ `match M with
or_introl $x \Rightarrow N$
|or_intror $y \Rightarrow P$
end` : C

This is a **Case analysis** on the tag specifying which part of the union M comes from.

or_e A B M (fun x:A=>N) (fun y:A=>P)

is *match M with
or_introl $x \Rightarrow N$
|or_intror $y \Rightarrow P$
end* .

Natural deduction as a Typing System

- $\wedge$ -introduction:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M : A \quad \Gamma \vdash N : B}{\Gamma \vdash \text{conj } M N : A \wedge B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash M : A \quad \Gamma \vdash N : B}{\Gamma \vdash \text{pair } M N : A * B}$$

`pair` $M N$ abbreviated as (M, N)

Again, no need for `and_i`: *and_i A B M N* is *conj M N*

This is a **Pair** / 2-component **Structure**.

Natural deduction as a Typing System

- $\wedge$ -elimination:

$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M : A \wedge B}{\text{match } M \text{ with } \Gamma \vdash \text{conj } x y \Rightarrow x : A \text{ end}}$	$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M : A \wedge B}{\text{match } M \text{ with } \Gamma \vdash \text{conj } x y \Rightarrow y : B \text{ end}}$
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This is the **Access to one component of a Pair / binary structure**.

Natural deduction as a Typing System

- Point raised: Type “Inference”
- With these rules, it is true that
Given Γ , M , there is *at most one* type A s.t. there is a decorated proof-tree concluding $\Gamma \vdash M : A$.
(& there is an algorithm to find it: run by *Check* command in Coq)
- Exercise: check this fact in all the decorated rules.
In particular, it relies on indicating “: A ” in $\rightarrow$ -intro rule ($\lambda x : A. M$)
Otherwise, how would you find the type of $\lambda x. x$?
Exercise: why is it not needed in the discharges of $\vee$ -elim?

Natural deduction: the actual rules for $\perp$ and $\neg$

- So far, no computational interpretation of $\perp$ and $\neg$:

- $\perp$ -introduction: none $\perp$ -elimination: $\frac{\perp}{A}$

- $\neg$ -introduction: $\frac{\begin{array}{c} [A] \\ \vdots \\ \perp \end{array}}{\neg A}$ $\neg$ -elimination: $\frac{A \quad \neg A}{\perp}$

Natural deduction as a Typing System *for* λ -calculus

- Implicational fragment ($\Rightarrow$ as the only connective), in *intuitionistic logic*. Syntax obtained:

$$M, N, P, \dots ::= x \mid \lambda x : A. M \mid M N$$

is the λ -calculus (Church, 30's).

Set of variables decorating open assumptions (k.a. **Free variables**):

$$\text{FV}(x) = x$$

$$\text{FV}(M N) = \text{FV}(M) \cup \text{FV}(N)$$

$$\text{FV}(\lambda x : A. M) = \text{FV}(M) \setminus \{x\}$$

Full lecture on it later.

Questions?