

NITRD meeting on The New Clockwork for Time-Critical Systems, Hyatt Baltimore 25, 26 October 2012, based on Planning Meeting for the National Workshop on The New Clockwork for Time-Critical Systems 11, 12 June 2012 at Holiday Inn, Fairborn (Dayton), Ohio 45324

# Timing Robustness and Fault-Tolerance

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## My Interest: Critical Systems

- Require very low **rates of failure**
  - Hence, redundancy, which adds complexity
- And **strong assurance**
  - Hence, preference for simplicity
- Conflict often resolved through **strong assumptions**
  - e.g., independent failures, synchronous networks
  - A lot of engineering needed to justify those
- Roughly, the challenge of **resilience** is to deliver reliability and assurance under weaker assumptions

## Past and Future Problems

- I'll assert that problems concerning timing **within** a single system (which may itself be distributed and fault tolerant) are largely solved
  - Even though the state-of-the-art has not penetrated all application sectors
- For safety-critical systems, we generally build on a **synchronous** substrate
  - i.e., guaranteed bound on nonfaulty message delivery
- With nodes that fail **independently**
- Can then provide provably fault-tolerant clock synchronization
- And can employ time-triggered techniques on top
  - Eases fault tolerance, design, debugging
- Costly to develop, but now COTS (e.g., TTE)

## Past and Future Problems

- I think the opportunities and challenges for the future arise when we relax former assumptions and expectations
- Underlying substrate is **not synchronous**, but **is synchronized**
  - e.g., with GPS, 1588
  - Can we still achieve  $10^{-9}$ ?
  - Can we do new things?
- Instead of a **single system**, we have a **system of systems**
- I'll think of a system as something that interacts with an environment and performs an independently useful function

## Systems of Systems

- We put systems together (i.e., **compose** them), so that each becomes (part of) the environment of the other, because...
  - We actually want the combination of their capabilities (**symmetrical** use case)
  - Or one system needs some capabilities and it is simpler or cheaper to use another system to provide them, rather than develop a bespoke component (**asymmetrical** use case)
  - Or we didn't realize the consequences of our (often incremental) actions (**accidental** use case)
- And along with the benefits of composition, we sometimes get the flaws
  - E.g., car CD player has entire Linux inside; enables penetration of system and remote control of throttle/brakes (CarShark)

## Emergent Misbehavior

- Complex systems can have failures not readily predicted from their components, interactions, or design
- Call this emergent misbehavior
- I'll save for another day the discussion whether these misbehaviors are merely unexpected or truly emergent
  - e.g., maybe some are due to downward causation
- But I think it can be useful to consider these failures as different in kind than the usual ones
- Examples
  - Feature interaction in telephone systems
  - West/East coast phone and power blackouts
  - 1993 shootdown of US helicopters by US planes in Iraq
  - Überlingen mid-air collision

## Causes of Emergent Misbehavior

- I think they all come down to **epistemic uncertainty**
  - i.e., ignorance
- There is no **complete and accurate** description of the system simpler than the system itself
- But all our analysis and verification are with respect to **abstractions** and **models**, hence we are ignorant about the full set of system qualities
- More particularly, we may be ignorant about
  - The **complete** set of **requirements** we will care about in the composed system
  - The **complete** set of **behaviors** of each component
  - The **complete** set of **interactions** among the components



# How to Eliminate or Control Emergent Misbehavior

- Identify and reduce ignorance, or equivalently improve the quality of our models
  - Is there a measure for doubt, for ignorance?
  - Economists tell me it would look like entropy
- Eliminate or control unanticipated behaviors and interactions
  - i.e., **deal** with the **manifestations** of ignorance
- Engineer resilience
  - i.e., **adapt** to the **consequences** of ignorance
- Let's focus on the latter two, wrt. timing

# Timing Robustness and Fault Tolerance In Systems of Systems

- Suppose we have large and variable delays in sensor and data exchange
- Potentially leading to instability and failures
- But we have system-wide synchronization (e.g., via GPS)
- i.e., **system is synchronized but not synchronous**
- Can **dynamically** create some of the attributes of time-triggered design
- e.g., using **sparse time** and  **$\pi/\Delta$  precedence**
  - Events happen within  $\pi$  of each other, or at least  $\Delta$  apart
  - Can then (but not otherwise) always sort out the **temporal ordering** of timestamped events
  - Parameters depend on **synchronization**, **not delays**

## Challenges (1)

- Develop a comprehensive “theory” for this or other weakly synchronous approaches to this class of systems
  - i.e., my estimate of your state is accurate, and accurately timestamped, but (boundedly?) old
  - And sometimes messages are lost or arbitrarily delayed
- Or should we devolve to the asynchronous model?
  - With failure detectors
- Or to one of the partial synchrony models?
- These deal with various “degrees” of asynchrony, but do not contemplate that the system is synchronized
- Is there a decent programming model for any of these?
  - cf. Giotto for time-triggered

## Challenges (2)

- Next, suppose we do not have a global source of synchronization (like GPS)
  - Or suppose that it is intermittent
- We want a method of **fault-tolerant** synchronization that
  - Does not assume a synchronous substrate (i.e., delays may be unbounded)
    - ★ Presumably need **some** additional assumptions
  - Is self-stabilizing (no special startup or reintegration)
  - Coexists and integrates with a global clock (i.e., GPS)
  - Tolerates a wide **range** and **number** of faults
  - Is high quality and degrades gracefully
- I know of no off-the-shelf algorithm with all these attributes

## Challenges (3)

In systems with large and variable delays, should we...

- Try to develop control algorithms and fault-tolerance mechanisms that can cope with this?
- Or do synchronization and techniques like  $\pi/\Delta$  precedence give us enough to use conventional algorithms?

## A Thought Experiment

- Suppose that at some point in a system development I discern the need to make some part of it fault tolerant
- I could choose a strong (i.e., restrictive) fault model
- Then that might enable me to design a correspondingly simple algorithm to perform the fault tolerance
- Thus, I might have very **few doubts** about whether my algorithm is **correct** (wrt. its fault model)
- But I might have **considerable doubts** about whether the fault model will be **valid** in the real context of its deployment
- Alternatively, I could make few assumptions about the faults
- But then the mechanisms to tolerate those faults might take me into the world of complex adaptive systems
- Here I have **fewer** doubts about **validity** of the fault model, but **more** about **correctness** of my algorithm&implementation

## Resilience

- There are just two sources of uncertainty (in the sense of doubt) in an assurance case
  - **Epistemic**: extent and accuracy of my **knowledge** about the system, its requirements, environment, etc.
  - **Logic**: validity of my **reasoning** about the correctness of the design wrt. requirements
  - cf. Validation and Verification (V&V)
- There is some opportunity to trade these (recall example)
- Traditionally, in critical systems, we have favored reducing logic doubt at the expense of epistemic doubt
  - e.g., no adaptive systems in flight control
- **Resilience** is about tipping the balance in the other direction
- But without **too much** logic doubt

## Challenges (4)

- We want resilience wrt. timing
- One aspect is to develop methods for efficient formal verification of complex synchronization and time-triggered algorithms
  - e.g., IEEE 802 AVB, or 1588 itself
- Another is to develop algorithms and architectures for timing that are resilient wrt. system assumptions
  - e.g., do not assume an (always) synchronous substrate
  - Presumably adaptive in some way
- Finally, develop methods for formally verifying such adaptive approaches



## Closing

- The [New Clockwork](#) creates opportunities through ubiquity and precision
- Some challenges are to provide extreme reliability and strong assurance
  - Former may require a thread of synchronous behavior
    - ★ “Timely Computer Base”
  - Latter requires new(?) system models for asynchronous but synchronized computation
- Harbinger of new interest in resilience
  - Weaker (but more credible) assumptions
  - Systems that are more intricate (harder to verify)