What Is Assurance?

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A Conundrum

- Critical systems are those where failures can have unacceptable consequences: typically safety or security.
- Cannot eliminate failures with certainty (because the environment is uncertain), so top-level claims about the system are stated quantitatively.
  - E.g., no catastrophic failure in the lifetime of all airplanes of one type.
- And these lead to probabilistic requirements for software-intensive subsystems.
  - E.g., probability of failure in flight control less than $10^{-9}$ per hour.
- But V&V is all about showing correctness.
- And for stronger claims, we do more V&V.
- So how does amount of V&V relate to probability of failure?
Background
The Basis For Assurance and Certification

- We have **claims** or **goals** that we want to substantiate
  - Typically claims about a critical property such as **security** or **safety**
  - Or some functional property, or a combination
    E.g., no catastrophic failure condition in the life of the fleet
- We produce **evidence** about the **product** and its development **process** to support the claims
  - E.g., analysis and testing of the product and its design
  - And documentation for the process of its development
- And we have an **argument** that the evidence is **sufficient** to support the claims
- Surely, this is the intellectual basis for **all** certification regimes

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Standards-Based Approaches to Certification

- Applicant follows a prescribed process
  - Delivers prescribed outputs
    - e.g., documented requirements, designs, analyses, tests and outcomes; traceability among these
    - These provide evidence

- The goals and argument are largely implicit

- Common Criteria (security) and DO-178B (civil aircraft) are like this

- Works well in fields that are stable or change slowly
  - No accidents due to software, but several incidents
  - Can institutionalize lessons learned, best practice
    - e.g. evolution of DO-178 from A to B to C

- May be less suitable with novel problems, solutions, methods
The Argument-Based Approach to Certification

• E.g., UK air traffic management (CAP670 SW01), defence (DefStan 00-56), Railways (Yellow Book), EU Nuclear, growing interest elsewhere (e.g., FDA, NTSB)

• Applicant develops a safety case
  ◦ Whose outline form may be specified by standards or regulation (e.g., 00-56)
  ◦ Makes an explicit set of goals or claims
  ◦ Provides supporting evidence for the claims
  ◦ And arguments that link the evidence to the claims
    * Make clear the underlying assumptions and judgments

• The case is evaluated by independent assessors

• The main novelty is the explicit argument

• Generalized to security, dependability, assurance cases
Software Reliability

- Software contributes to system failures through faults in its requirements, design, implementation—bugs

- A bug that leads to failure is certain to do so whenever it is encountered in similar circumstances
  - There’s nothing probabilistic about it

- Aaah, but the circumstances of the system are a stochastic process

- So there is a probability of encountering the circumstances that activate the bug

- Hence, probabilistic statements about software reliability or failure are perfectly reasonable

- Typically speak of probability of failure on demand (pfld), or failure rate (per hour, say)
Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty

- **Aleatory** or **irreducible** uncertainty
  - is “uncertainty in the world”
  - e.g., if I have a coin with $P(\text{heads}) = p_h$, I cannot predict exactly how many heads will occur in 100 trials because of randomness in the world

  *Frequentist* interpretation of probability needed here

- **Epistemic** or **reducible** uncertainty
  - is “uncertainty about the world”
  - e.g., if I give you the coin, you will not know $p_h$; you can estimate it, and can try to improve your estimate by doing experiments, learning something about its manufacture, the historical record of similar coins etc.

  *Frequentist* and *subjective* interpretations OK here
Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty in Models

- In much scientific modeling, the aleatory uncertainty is captured conditionally in a model with parameters.
- And the epistemic uncertainty centers upon the values of these parameters.
- As in the coin tossing example: $p_h$ is the parameter.
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Measuring/Predicting Software Reliability

- For pfds down to about $10^{-4}$, it is feasible to measure software reliability by statistically valid random testing
- But $10^{-9}$ would need 114,000 years on test
- So how do we establish that a piece of software is adequately reliable for a system that requires, say, $10^{-6}$?
- Standards for system security or safety (e.g., Common Criteria, DO178B) require you to do a lot of V&V
  - e.g., 57 V&V “objectives” at DO178B Level C ($10^{-5}$)
- And you have to do more for higher levels
  - 65 objectives at DO178B Level B ($10^{-7}$)
  - 66 objectives at DO178B Level A ($10^{-9}$)
- What’s the connection between amount of V&V (mostly focused on correctness) and degree of software reliability?
Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty for Software

• We are interested in some probabilistic property of the software’s *dynamic* behavior
  ○ There is aleatoric uncertainty due to variability in the circumstances of the software’s operation

• We examine the *static* attributes of the software to form an epistemic estimate of the property
  ○ More examination refines the estimate

• For what kinds of properties does this work?
Perfect Software

- Property cannot be about some executions of the software
  - Like how many fail
  - Because the epistemic examination is static (i.e., global)
  - This is the difficulty with reliability
- Must be a property about all executions, like correctness
- But correctness is relative to specifications, which themselves may be flawed
- We want correctness relative to the critical claims
  - Taken directly from the system’s assurance case
- Call that perfection
- Software that will never experience a failure in operation, no matter how much operational exposure it has

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Possibly Perfect Software

- You might not believe a given piece of software is perfect
- But you might concede it has a possibility of being perfect
- And the more V&V it has had, the greater that possibility
- So we can speak of a (subjective) probability of perfection
- For a frequentist interpretation: think of all the software that might have been developed by comparable engineering processes to solve the same design problem as the software at hand
  - And that has had the same degree of V&V
- The probability of perfection is then the probability that any software randomly selected from this class is perfect
Probabilities of Perfection and Failure

- Probability of perfection relates to correctness-based V&V
- But it also relates to reliability:

  By the formula for total probability

  \[
  P(s/w \text{ fails [on a randomly selected demand]}) = P(s/w \text{ fails } | s/w \text{ perfect}) \times P(s/w \text{ perfect}) \\
  + P(s/w \text{ fails } | s/w \text{ imperfect}) \times P(s/w \text{ imperfect}).
  \]

  - The first term in this sum is zero, because the software does not fail if it is perfect (other properties won’t do)
  - Hence, define
    - \( p_{np} \) probability the software is imperfect
    - \( p_{fnp} \) probability that it fails, if it is imperfect
  - Then \( P(\text{software fails}) < p_{fnp} \times p_{np} \)
  - This analysis is aleatoric, with parameters \( p_{fnp} \) and \( p_{np} \)
Epistemic Estimation

• To apply this result, we need to assess values for \( p_{fnp} \) and \( p_{np} \)
• These are most likely subjective probabilities
  ○ i.e., degrees of belief
• Beliefs about \( p_{fnp} \) and \( p_{np} \) may not be independent
• So will be represented by some joint distribution \( F(p_{fnp}, p_{np}) \)
• Probability of software failure will be given by the Riemann-Stieltjes integral

\[
\int_{0 \leq p_{fnp} \leq 1}^{0 \leq p_{np} \leq 1} p_{fnp} \times p_{np} \, dF(p_{fnp}, p_{np}) .
\] (2)

• If beliefs can be separated \( F \) factorizes as \( F(p_{fnp}) \times F(p_{np}) \)
• And (2) becomes \( P_{fnp} \times P_{np} \)

Where these are the means of the posterior distributions representing the assessor’s beliefs about the two parameters
**V&V and the Probability of Perfection**

- Operational experience validates effectiveness of V&V processes such as DO-178B Level A
  - i.e., software failure rate $< 10^{-9}$

- Our analysis says software failure rate $< P_{fnp} \times P_{np}$

- Littlewood and Povyakalo show (under independence assumption) that large number of failure-free runs shifts assessment from imperfect but reliable toward perfect

- So flight software might well have probabilities of imperfection $< 10^{-9}$

- No comparable experience for Common Criteria EALs
Aside: Two Channel Systems
Two Channel Systems

- Many safety-critical systems have two (or more) diverse “channels” arranged in 1-out-of-2 (1oo2) structure
  - E.g., nuclear shutdown

- A primary protection system is responsible for plant safety

- A simpler secondary channel provides a backup

- **Cannot** simply multiply the pfds of the two channels to get pfd for the system
  - Failures are unlikely to be independent
  - E.g., failure of one channel suggests this is a difficult case, so failure of the other is more likely
  - Infeasible to measure amount of dependence

So, traditionally, difficult to assess the reliability delivered
Two Channel Systems and Possible Perfection

• But if the second channel is simple enough to support a plausible claim of possible perfection
  ◦ Its imperfection is conditionally independent of failures in the first channel at the aleatory level
  ◦ Hence, system pfd is conservatively bounded by product of pfd of first channel and probability of imperfection of the second
    ◦ \( P(\text{system fails on randomly selected demand} \leq pfd_A \times pnp_B) \)

• Epistemic assessment similar to previous case
  ◦ But may be more difficult to separate beliefs
  ◦ Conservative approximations are available
Type 1 and Type 2 Failures in 1oo2 Systems

- So far, considered only failures of omission
  - Type 1 failure: both channels fail to respond to a demand
- Must also consider failures of commission
  - Type 2 failure: either channel responds to a non-demand
- Demands are events at a point in time; nondemands are absence of demands over an interval of time
- So full model must unify these
- Details straightforward but lengthy

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Monitored Architectures

- One operational channel does the business
- Simpler monitor channel can shut it down if things look bad
- Used in airplanes

Analysis is a variant of 1oo2:
  - No Type 2 failures for operational channel

Monitored architecture risk per unit time
\[ \leq c_1 \times (M_1 + F_A \times P_B^1) + c_2 \times (M_2 + F_{B2|np} \times P_B^2) \]
where the \( M_s \) are due to mechanism shared between channels

- May provide justification for some of the architectures suggested in ARP 4754
  - e.g., \( 10^{-9} \) system made of Level C operational channel and Level A monitor
Monitors Do Fail

- Fuel emergency on Airbus A340-642, G-VATL, 8 February 2005
  - Type 1 failure

- EFIS Reboot during spin recovery on Airbus A300 (American Airlines Flight 903), 12 May 1997
  - Type 2 failure

- Current proposals are for formally synthesized/verified monitors for properties in the safety case
Monitors for Security

- A reference monitor is not a monitor in this sense
  - It’s the primary (usually sole) protection mechanism
- The closest equivalents would be wrappers and firewalls
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Application to Formal Verification

- We know DO-178B “works”
- But it’s expensive
- Formal verification can be cheaper
  - Yes it can!
- But is often burdened by belief that it must support a claim of absolute correctness and must therefore itself be infallible
  - Leads to inappropriate allocation of resources or choice of techniques (e.g., no decision procedures)
- We now know it needs to support a claim of possible perfection
- So let’s see where that goes
Formal Verification and the Probability of Perfection

• We want to assess $P_{np}$ for something like a monitor

• Context is an assurance case in which claims about a system are justified by an argument based on evidence about the system and its development

• Suppose part of the evidence is formal verification

• What is the probability of perfection of formally verified software?

• Surely a function of the ways in which formal verification can fail
  ◦ i.e., the hazards to formal verification

• So let’s enumerate these and look for techniques that can provide assurance those hazards are eliminated
The Basic Requirements For The Software Are Wrong

- This error is made before any formalization
- It seems to be the dominant source of errors in flight software
- But monitoring and backup software are built to requirements taken directly from the safety case
  - If these are wrong, we have big problems
- So this concern belongs at a higher level
The Requirements etc. are Formalized Incorrectly

- Could also be the assumptions, or the design that are formalized incorrectly

- Formalization may be inconsistent
  - i.e., meaningless

Can be eliminated using constructive specifications
  - In a tool-supported framework
  - That guarantees conservative extension

But that’s not always appropriate
  - Prefer to state assumptions as axioms
  - Consistency can then be guaranteed by exhibiting a constructive model (interpretation)
  - PVS can do this

- So we can eliminate concern about inconsistency
The Requirements etc. are Formalized Incorrectly (ctd.)

- Formalization may be consistent, but wrong
- Formal specifications that have not been subjected to analysis are no more likely to be correct than programs that have never been run
  - In fact, less so: engineers have better intuitions about programs than specifications
- Should challenge formal specifications
  - Prove putative theorems
  - Get counterexamples for deliberately false conjectures
  - Directly execute them on test cases
- Social process operates on widely used theories
- In my experience, incorrect formalization is the dominant source of errors in formal verification
  - There are papers on errors in my specifications

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The Requirements etc. are Formalized Incorrectly (ctd. 2)

- Even if a theory or specification is formalized incorrectly, it does not necessarily invalidate all theorems that use it.

- **Only if the verification actually exploits the incorrectness will the validity of the theorem be in doubt.**
  - Even then, it could still be true, but unproven.

- Some verification systems identify all the axioms and definitions on which a formally verified conclusion depends.
  - PVS does this.
  
  If these are correct, then logical validity of the verified conclusion follows by soundness of the verification system.
  - Can apply special scrutiny to them.

- So concern about incorrect formalization can be managed.
The Formal Specification and Verification is Discontinuous or Incomplete

- **Discontinuities** arise when several analysis tools are applied in the same specification
  - e.g., static analyzer, model checker, timing analyzer
  Concern is that different tools ascribe different semantics
- Increasing issue as specialized tools outstrip monolithic ones
  - Need integrating frameworks such as a tool bus
- Most significant **incompleteness** is generally the gap between the most detailed model and the real thing
  - Algorithms vs. code, libraries, OS calls
  That's one reason why we still need testing
    - Driven from the formal specification
    - Cf. penetration tests for security: probe the assumptions
- **Concerns about incompleteness need to be managed**
Unsoundness In the Verification System

- **All** verification systems have had soundness bugs
- But **none** have been exploited to prove a false theorem
- Many efforts to guarantee soundness are costly
  - e.g., reduction to elementary steps, proof objects
  - What does soundness matter if you cannot do the proof?
- A better approach is **KOT**: the **Kernel Of Truth** (Shankar)
  - A ladder of increasingly powerful verified checkers
  - Untrusted prover leaves a trail, blessed by verified checker
  - More powerful checkers guaranteed by one-time check of its verification by the one below
  - The more powerful the verified checker, the more economical the trail can be (little more than hints)
- **So concern about unsoundness can be reduced**
Example

- Suppose we can get $P_{fnp} < 10^{-3}$ by testing, want $P_{np}$ of $10^{-3}$
  - So system will then be $< 10^{-6}$

- Through sufficiently careful and comprehensive formal challenges, it is plausible an assessor can assign a subjective posterior probability of imperfection on the order of $10^{-3}$ to the formal statements on which a formal verification depends

- Through testing and other scrutiny, a similar figure can be assigned to the probability of imperfection due to discontinuities and incompleteness in the formal analysis

- By use of a verification system with a trusted or verified kernel, or trusted, verified, or diverse checkers, assessor can assign probability of $10^{-4}$ or smaller that the theorem prover incorrectly verified the theorems that attest to perfection

- We’re done!

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Discussion

• These numbers are feasible and plausible
  ○ Really? Why $10^{-3}$ and not $10^{-2}$ or $10^{-4}$?
  ○ Need to develop basis for numerical estimates
  ○ If you believe my analysis, historical record suggests
    DO-178B Level A does justify very strong estimates

• Formal methods and their tools do not need to be held to
  (much) higher standards than the systems they assure

• Remember Fetzer’s jeremiad?

• This is the first analysis that supports a measured response
Conclusion

- **Probability of perfection** is a radical and valuable idea
  - It’s due to Bev Littlewood

- Provides the bridge between correctness-based verification activities and probabilistic claims needed at the system level

- Relieves formal verification, and its tools, of the burden of infallibility
  - Allows rational allocations of resources to hazards

- Could help in rebalancing the assurance activities at higher EALs of the Common Criteria

- Likely to work well in an assurance case framework

- Homework: application to layered assurance