Formal Composition for Time-Triggered Systems

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Objective: Generic Form

- Models
- Transformation
- Time-Triggered Impl’n

We do

- Assurance
- Based on mechanized Formal Methods

Nonfunctional Attributes
Objective: Specific Form

Stateflow/Simulink + TTTech additions

Analyze models
Verify transformations
Verify TT services
To yield assurance for final system
Approach

Background:

- We are the developers of PVS, a system for formal verification (used in about 300 sites)
- We are making its decision procedures available as ICS
- And are building a system SAL that integrates PVS and several other tools such as model checkers

Here, in year 1, we focus on

- Formal semantics and assurance for Stateflow/Simulink
- And design and assurance issues in Time-Triggered Systems
Progress: Semantics and Assurance

For Stateflow/Simulink

- Formal semantics for Stateflow based on translation to Extended Communicating Pushdown Automata (CPDA)
  - And mechanization in SAL
    - Can check for bounded stack depth
    - Can model check
- Method for symbolic analysis of Simulink based on cylindrical algebraic decomposition (CAD)
  - And mechanization in SAL (using qepcad)
    - Can push symbolic values through a Simulink model
- And the integration of these
Sideslip exceeded $20^\circ$, normal acceleration exceeded first $-4g$, then $+7g$, angle of attack went to $-10^\circ$, then $+20^\circ$, the aircraft rolled $360^\circ$, the vertical tail exceeded design load, all control surfaces were operating at rate limits, and failure indications were received from the hydraulics and canard actuators.

The side air-data probe was blanked by the canard at the high angle of attack and sideslip achieved during the excursion; the wide input threshold passed the incorrect value through, and different channels took different paths through the control laws.

Analysis showed this would have caused complete failure of the DFCS for several areas of the flight envelope.

Hence, interested in discrete mode changes in continuous systems.
Analyzing Stateflow/Simulink Models

Simulink model

Stateflow model
Simulate One Trajectory at a Time

Simulink model

Stateflow model

Just like testing: when have you done enough?
Model Check With 

Nondeterministic Environment 

Nondeterministic environment 

Stateflow 
model 

Too crude to establish useful properties
Simulate “Envelope” of Trajectories

Data or flow pipes do this

Simulink model

Stateflow model

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Model Check With Environment Props

Established by Symbolic Evaluation

Properties established of a discretization by CAD

Stateflow model

Model check this
Progress: Semantics and Assurance

For Stateflow/Simulink

Assuming the discretizations are conservative:

- Can prove the simple version of the state consistency challenge
- Can prove simplified collision avoidance controller maintains positive gap

Useful for debugging even if not conservative

- Can determine bounded stack depth
**Progress: Design and Assurance Issues**

**In Time-Triggered Implementations**

- Have formally verified most of the key algorithms of TTA (NASA project): clock synchronization, group membership, guardian window timing
  - Remaining: clique avoidance, integration


- Contemplating an introduction to time-triggered systems
Tech Transfer and OEPs

- Applying all this to Honeywell project developing new-generation FADEC built on TTA for a NATO aircraft

- Formal Stateflow and Simulink analysis available (soon) to any OEP tool suite using XML (if it runs on Linux)
  - Extending to other Statechart variants
  - E.g., UML (in collaboration with TU Budapest)

  Can also tackle challenge problems at the modeling level

- Time-triggered design needs more proselytizing
Part II

- Progress
- Plan
Progress

- Semantics for Stateflow in SAL
- Stateflow model analysis
- Simulink to SAL
- Analysis for Simulink models
Semantics for Stateflow in SAL

The translation consists of two basic steps:

- Translating a Stateflow chart into extended communicating pushdown automata (CPDA).
- Translating the extended CPDA into SAL.

Semantics of a Stateflow transition is obtained in terms of a SAL transition.

Translation handles hierarchy, nested event broadcasting, junctions, and supertransitions.
• Automata: State machines in Stateflow

• Stack: nested event broadcasting (infinite loops possible)
  Stack holds history of control flow and partially processed events

• Communication: inter-level transitions, hierarchy
Example: Translation

On:
Entry: entOn();
During: durOn();
Exit: exitOn();

E₁[true]{x := 1}/E₁

Off:
Entry: entOff();
During: durOff();
Exit: exitOff();

E₁{x := 1}/E₁

E₁{x := 1}

done

/R₁

/R₁
Example: Flow Diagram Notation Translation
Features of Translation

Features:

- modularity preservation: automata ↔ SAL module.
- Stateflow transition map to multiple SAL transitions.
- communication between automata ↔ module composition with variable renaming.
Sample Transitions

contra6 AND preIn12 AND NOT state14 AND true -->
    preOu13' = TRUE;
    oport15' = TRUE;
    contra6' = FALSE
contra6 AND preIn12 AND state14 AND true -->
    ....
contra6 AND defIn16 AND NOT state14 AND true -->
    ....
contra6 AND NOT defIn16 AND NOT preIn12 AND NOT state14 -->
    ....
contra6 AND state14 AND NOT defIn16 AND NOT preIn12 -->
    ....
Sample Transitions

iport24 AND state2 AND traLo3 AND top(stack) = e0 -->
  push(e9);
oport26' = TRUE;
oport7' = TRUE;

conBI8 AND iport27 AND state2 AND top(stack) = e9 -->
x' = OR(x, true);
stack' = push(e10, S1, e0, stack);
oport28' = TRUE;
Progress

- Semantics for Stateflow in SAL
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Stateflow Model Analysis

- reachability
- detecting event loops
- model checking

Theorem proving for verifying data invariants and type correctness.
Bounded Stack Depth

The first Stateflow model needs only a bounded stack whereas the second one contains a loop:
Bounded Stack Depth

Approach:

- Construct a Multi-Finite Automata that accepts all states reachable from some starting state
- Check for a loop in the Multi-Finite Automata

Observation: $post^* (\phi)$ is “regular” if $\phi$ is “regular” in case of transition systems specified by PDAs.

Translation to SAL and bounded depth check is written in Java.

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State Consistency Challenge

**Observation:** Controllers for hybrid systems often replicate and track the modes of the physical system.

**Challenge:** To show that within some sampled-data constraints, the controller states and the physical plant states are consistent.

**Insight:** State consistency is essentially a property about the Stateflow components and we can use some abstraction of the environment.
Powertrain Control

- Stateflow components in the physical plant and the controller are both translated into guarded transition systems using the developed semantics.

- All predicates in the guards of the Stateflow transitions are nondeterministically set by the environment. More refined predicate abstraction of the environment (over the Stateflow guards) can also be done.

- Various state consistency properties are then model checked.
state == first_gear ∧ V > 6 → state = shift_pending;
ctr = 0;
transmission: CONTEXT =
BEGIN
SchedulerState: TYPE = { inactive, t55, ..., t3, t4 };
ControllerState: TYPE = { inact, first, second, shift12,
                         change, reset, inertia12 };
TransmissionState: TYPE = { tfirst, torque12, tinertia12,
                          tsecond, not_engaged };
Turn: TYPE = { sch, con, tra, env};
system : MODULE =
BEGIN
  LOCAL sch_state : SchedulerState
  LOCAL tran_state : TransmissionState
  LOCAL con_state : ControllerState
  LOCAL Vleq6, Vleq3 : BOOLEAN
  ...
TRANSITION
  (con_state = shift12) AND NOT to_gear AND NOT R1wt_gt_wcr -->
  con_state' = reset;
  pc' = tra;
  tc2zero' = FALSE
Details: Environment Representation

**boolean variable** $V_{\leq 6}$: represents the predicate $V \leq 6$

**boolean variable** $V_{\leq 3}$: represents the predicate $V \leq 3$

Environment transitions:

- $V_{\leq 6} = \text{TRUE} \quad \rightarrow \quad V_{\leq 3}' = \text{TRUE};$
  
- $V_{\leq 6}' = \text{TRUE}$

- $V_{\leq 3} = \text{FALSE} \quad \rightarrow \quad V_{\leq 3}' = \text{FALSE};$
  
- $V_{\leq 6}' = \text{FALSE}$

- $\text{TRUE} \quad \rightarrow \quad V_{\leq 3}' = \text{FALSE};$
  
- $V_{\leq 6}' = \text{TRUE}$
- if control and transmission enter state “second-gear”, then they remain in that state forever.

- if controller is in “change-of-mind” state, then transmission can not go to “second-gear” without first going to “first-gear”.

\[
\Box((\text{con\_state} = \text{change}) \rightarrow
\Box((\text{tran\_state} \neq t\text{second}) \mathcal{W} (\text{tran\_state} = t\text{first})))
\]

\[
\Box((\text{con\_state} = \text{change}) \rightarrow
\Box((\text{tran\_state} \neq t\text{second}) \mathcal{U} (\text{tran\_state} = t\text{first})))
\]
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How to reason about the environment?

General analytical methods are difficult to come up with.

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{V} &= \frac{1}{1644}(7920 - 25800 \frac{V}{\omega_{wf}} - 0.45V^2) \\
\omega_{wf} &= \frac{1}{2.8}(T_s - 2505 + 8000 \frac{V}{\omega_{wf}}) \\
\dot{T}_s &= 2374\omega_{cr} - 6742\omega_{wf}
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore, we reason about some discretization of the system.
Simulink does the same too.
Progress

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Symbolic simulation with widening for initial states given by symbolic (polynomial) expressions over the state variables.

Old state:

\[ \phi(\bar{V}, \bar{W}) \]

Transition:

\[ \psi(\bar{V}, \bar{W}) \quad \rightarrow \quad V = \bar{V} + (a\bar{W} + b\bar{V} + c\bar{V}^2\bar{W}) \frac{1}{\bar{W}}; \quad W = \ldots \]

New state:

\[ \exists(\bar{V}, \bar{W}).(\phi \land \psi \land V = \bar{V} + (a\bar{W} + b\bar{V} + c\bar{V}^2\bar{W}) \frac{1}{\bar{W}} \land W = \ldots) \]
Using QE for real closed fields, we can solve:

$$\exists(\bar{V}, \bar{W}).(\phi \land \psi \land \bar{W}V = \bar{W}\bar{V} + (a\bar{W} + b\bar{V} + c\bar{V}^2\bar{W}) \land W = \ldots)$$

If we are given intervals for all state variables, then the highest degree is bounded by the degrees of polynomials in the Simulink model.
Consider a highly simplified collision avoidance control

\[
\begin{align*}
gap &= u - v \\
\dot{u} &= A \\
\dot{v} &= A + gap - 5 \\
A &: \text{Input Variable}
\end{align*}
\]

Initial conditions (which trigger this control):

\[u - v = 0 \land v \geq 0 \land gap \geq 9\]

To prove that \(gap\) is always positive.
Illustration: Collision Avoidance

A symbolic simulation using qepcad for quantifier elimination yields the following:

\[ \phi_0 : \quad u - v = 0 \land v \geq 0 \land gap \geq 9 \]
\[ \phi_1 : \quad \exists (\bar{a}, \bar{gap}, \bar{v}, \bar{u}) : \]
\[ \quad gap = \bar{gap} + \frac{1}{10}(\bar{u} - \bar{v}) \land \]
\[ \quad v = \bar{v} + \frac{1}{10}(\bar{a} + \bar{gap} - 5) \land \]
\[ \quad u = \bar{u} + \frac{1}{10}(\bar{a}) \land \]
\[ \quad \bar{u} - \bar{v} = 0 \land \bar{v} \geq 4 \land \bar{gap} \geq 9 \]
\[ : \quad 10u - 10v + gap - 5 = 0 \land 10u - 10v - 99gap + 895 \leq 0 \]
\[ : \quad 10u - 10v + gap - 5 = 0 \land gap \geq 9 \]
Illustration: Collision Avoidance

Second iteration:

\[ \phi_2 : \exists (\bar{a}, \bar{g} \bar{a} \bar{p}, \bar{u}, \bar{v}) : \]

\[ gap = \bar{g} \bar{a} \bar{p} + \frac{1}{10} (\bar{u} - \bar{v}) \land \]

\[ v = \bar{v} + \frac{1}{10} (\bar{a} + \bar{g} \bar{a} \bar{p} - 5) \land \]

\[ u = \bar{u} + \frac{1}{10} (\bar{a}) \land \]

\[ 10\bar{u} - 10\bar{v} + \bar{g} \bar{a} \bar{p} - 5 = 0 \land \bar{g} \bar{a} \bar{p} \geq 9 \]

\[ : 5u - 5v - 50gap + 452 \leq 0 \land 10u - 10v + gap - 5 = 0 \]

\[ : gap \geq 9 \land 10u - 10v + gap - 5 = 0 \]

In general, require simplification and widening for termination.
Plan I

Analysis and verification:

- Integrate with the Vanderbilt parser
- Use techniques on larger examples made available by OEPs
- Typechecking Stateflow/Simulink models
Invisible Methods

In general, can not certify without complete understanding (unless simple classes of
decidable system)

But, some automatic analysis is still possible, which can then be used further for full
verification.

Checking is simpler than proving, so with some help from control designer, can
(formally prove) derive more information about models.

Technology: Typechecking
A guarded transition

\[ \phi \rightarrow x' = \frac{1}{y} + \ldots \]

generates a type correctness proof obligation

\[ \square(\phi \Rightarrow y \neq 0) \]

We can go beyond and use the richer type system supported by PVS: specify types using Simulink blocks in the model.

For example, assertions like \( x > y \), etc.
Plan II

Multiple-view modeling:

- Semantics of a time-triggered specification language in SAL
- Notion of consistency between different levels
Plan III

Test vector generation — explore different coverage criteria such as that based on signs of polynomials that appear in the description, etc.