In this paper, we study the defensibility of large scale-free networks against malicious rapidly self-propagating code such as worms and viruses. We develop a framework to investigate the profiles of such code as it infects a large network. Based on these profiles and large-scale network percolation studies, we investigate features of networks that render them more or less defensible against worms. However, we wish to preserve mission-relevant features of the network, such as basic connectivity and resilience to normal nonmalicious outages. We aim to develop methods to help design networks that preserve critical functionality and enable more effective defenses.

@INPROCEEDINGS{briesemeister:worm:2003,
  AUTHOR = {Linda Briesemeister and Patrick Lincoln and Phillip Porras},
  TITLE = {Epidemic Profiles and Defense of Scale-Free Networks},
  BOOKTITLE = {Proceedings of the 2003 ACM Workshop on Rapid Malcode (WORM)},
  YEAR = {2003},
  MONTH = {October},
  ISBN = {1-58113-785-0},
  PAGES = {67--75},
  DOI = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/948187.948200},
}

• worm2003.pdf